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Abstract
Surveillance performance is studied for a wireless eavesdropping system, where a full-duplex
legitimate monitor eavesdrops a suspicious link efficiently with the artificial noise (AN) assistance.
Different from the existing work in the literature, the suspicious receiver in this paper is assumed
to be capable of detecting the presence of AN. Once such receiver detects the AN, the suspicious
user will stop transmission, which is harmful for the surveillance performance. Hence, to improve the
surveillance performance, AN should be transmitted covertly with a low detection probability by the
suspicious receiver. Under these assumptions, an optimization problem is formulated to maximize the
eavesdropping non-outage probability under a covert constraint. Based on the detection ability at the
suspicious receiver, a novel scheme is proposed to solve the optimization problem by iterative search.
Moreover, we investigate the impact of both the suspicious link uncertainty and the jamming link
uncertainty on the covert surveillance performance. Simulations are performed to verify the analyses.
We show that the suspicious link uncertainty benefits the surveillance performance, while the jamming
link uncertainty can degrade the surveillance performance.
Index Terms
Channel uncertainty, Covert communication, Full-duplex, Legitimate surveillance, Proactive eaves-
dropping.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security has been proposed as a promising solution to achieve perfect wire-
less secrecy against malicious eavesdropping attacks (see e.g. [1]–[3] and references therein).
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2These works often assume that communication users are legitimate and view the information
eavesdropping as malicious attacks. However, eavesdropping can also be legitimate behavior. For
example, when illegitimate users can potentially establish wireless communication links and pose
significant threats to national security, authorized parties must legitimately monitor suspicious
communication links for preventing crimes or terrorism attacks.
Many papers have been published on surveillance systems in wireless networks, such as [4]–
[11]. When the monitor is far away from a suspicious transmitter, it is challenging to eavesdrop
the suspicious link. To overcome this problem, a novel approach, namely proactive eavesdrop-
ping via artificial noise (AN), was proposed as an efficient way to improve the surveillance
performance. For example, a proactive full-duplex monitor purposely injects the AN to decrease
the achievable data rate at the suspicious receiver and facilitate simultaneous eavesdropping
[4], where the self-interference between the jamming antennas and the eavesdropping antennas
is neglected at the monitor. By contrast, considering the severe self-interference between the
jamming antennas and the eavesdropping antennas [5]–[7], the AN power at the monitor is
optimized to maximize the average eavesdropping rate. However, these works do not consider
the AN detection ability at the suspicious users. In practice, the suspicious users can be intelligent
and have the ability to detect the AN. Thus, if the AN power is large, the suspicious users can
detect the AN and stop their transmissions. As a result, the monitor cannot catch the illegitimate
information at all. Hence, the AN should be injected covertly without being detected by the
suspicious users.
Covert transmission is an emerging and cutting-edge communication security technique, which
guarantees a negligible detection probability at a warden [12]. In this regard, the authors in [13]
established the fundamental limits of covert communication in the form of a square root law,
which states that Alice could transmit no more than O (
√
n) bits rate to Bob in n channel
uses covertly and reliably. In particular, when n grows to infinity, the rate approaches zero,
i.e., limn→∞
O(
√
n)
n
= 0. Extensions of this work considered different channels, such as discrete
memoryless channels (DMCs) [14], binary symmetric channels (BSCs) [15] and multiple access
channels (MACs) [16]. Fortunately, such a pessimistic conclusion does not hold if the warden
has uncertainty about the statistics of the background noise [17]. Meanwhile, the authors of
[18] investigated the impact of noise uncertainty on detection error probability (DEP) at the
warden. Their results show that noise uncertainty is beneficial to covert transmission. In order
to further enhance the covert performance, cooperative jamming was also employed to increase
the noise uncertainty [19]–[22]. In [19], the authors employed uninformed jamming to achieve a
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3positive covert transmission rate. The jamming uncertainty was investigated in [20], [21], where
the locations of the jamming transmitters follow a stationary Poisson point process (PPP). The
performance analysis for covert transmission was also extended to multi-antenna systems in
[22], [23]. In addition, a full-duplex receiver injected AN and received messages simultaneously
in [24], [25], where the AN power was designed to achieve the desired level of covertness.
Furthermore, relay technology was deployed to enhance covert transmission performance in
[26]–[28].
In addition, the channel uncertainty at the warden can also affect the covert transmission per-
formance. Most recently, the impact of channel uncertainty on covert transmission performance
was studied in [29]–[31]. With regard to channel uncertainty, the channel state information (CSI)
can be separated into the known part and the uncertain part at the receiver. The warden can
determine the optimal detection threshold to cancel the known part. In [29], the authors derived
a closed-form expression for the optimal detection threshold and quantified the achievable rate.
It is shown in [29] that channel uncertainty could help hide the communication to a covert user.
The channel uncertainty was also exploited in [30] to achieve covert communication in relay
networks, where the introduced channel uncertainty confused the warden and limited the ultimate
detection performance. In [31], the simulation results show the channel uncertainty has a greater
effect on covert transmission rate when the noise uncertainty is larger.
Overall, in order to eavesdrop a suspicious communication link efficiently, the legitimate
monitor should inject AN covertly, and control the AN transmission power carefully. However,
to the best of the authors’ knowledge, intelligent suspicious users, which are capable of detecting
a jamming signal and can be common in future wireless networks, have not been well-understood
in the literature. Motivated by the above considerations, in this paper, we first study the detection
ability at the suspicious users. Then, a novel scheme is proposed to maximize the eavesdropping
non-outage probability by optimizing the injected AN power. Moreover, we also investigate the
impact of channel uncertainty on covert surveillance performance. The main contributions of
this paper are summarized as follows:
1. We consider a wireless surveillance system, where a full-duplex legitimate monitor tries to
eavesdrop on a suspicious link with AN assistance. Different from the previous works, such
as [5], [6], the suspicious receiver in this paper has the ability of detecting the AN signal,
which is a reasonable assumption in advanced receivers, such as cognitive and military-
grade receivers. Specifically, if the suspicious receiver detects the AN from the legitimate
monitor, it informs the suspicious transmitter to stop. As a result, the legitimate monitor can
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4overhear nothing. Hence, the legitimate monitor should inject AN covertly. For this scenario,
the performance of the surveillance system under a covert constraint is investigated in this
paper for the first time, to the best of our knowledge.
2. For the surveillance system, an optimization problem is formulated to maximize the eaves-
dropping non-outage probability while the minimum DEP at the suspicious receiver is less
than a given threshold. Closed-form expressions for the optimal detection threshold and
the minimum DEP are derived under quasi-static channel fading. Then, based on these
expressions, the covert constraint is transformed to an AN power constraint at the legitimate
monitor. Finally, we propose an algorithm to achieve the maximum eavesdropping non-
outage probability. Numerical results show that the proactive eavesdropping scheme under
a covert constraint substantially outperforms the two benchmark schemes in [4].
3. Considering that channel uncertainty is inevitable in practice, we analyze the suspicious
receiver’s AN detection ability under channel uncertainties first in the suspicious link and
then in the jamming link. Interestingly, we find that the AN detection ability decreases
with the suspicious link channel uncertainty, while it has a non-monotonic relationship
with the jamming link channel uncertainty. For the extreme case of perfect suspicious link
channel knowledge, the legitimate monitor cannot inject AN to assist its eavesdropping. By
contrast, when there exists channel uncertainty for the suspicious link, even if the suspicious
receiver has perfect knowledge of the jamming link, the legitimate monitor can still inject
AN without being detected.
4. We investigate the impact of channel uncertainty on the non-outage probability for the
proactive eavesdropping scheme. Numerical results reveal that the suspicious link channel
uncertainty is beneficial to covert surveillance performance. By contrast, the jamming link
channel uncertainty affects the surveillance system performance only when the AN power
introduces a higher level of interference power at the suspicious receiver than the self-
interference power at the legitimate full-duplex monitor. Moreover, since the jamming link
channel uncertainty has a non-monotonic effect on the AN detection ability, the legitimate
monitor can actively expose the channel knowledge of the jamming link to weaken the
suspicious user’s detection ability and improve the non-outage probability for the proactive
eavesdropping.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the covert surveillance
system model and assumptions. Section III investigates the problem of covert AN transmission.
The surveillance performance under a covert AN constraint is analyzed in Section IV. Special
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5TABLE I
SUMMARY OF NOTATIONS
Notation Description
hi,j The instantaneous CSI between i and j, i ∈ {Alice,Monitor}, j ∈ {Bob,Monitor}
ĥi,j The perfect known part of hi,j
h˜i,j The uncertain part of hi,j
ρi,j The correlation coefficient between hi,j and h˜i,j
σ2i,j The covariance of hi,j
σ2j The noise covariance at node j
Γ The detection threshold at Bob
Γ∗ The optimum detection threshold at Bob
ξ The detection error probability at Bob
ξ∗ The minimum detection probability at Bob
ξ¯∗ The average minimum detection probability at Bob
Pa The transmission power at Alice
PmaxJ The maximum transmission power at Monitor
PJ The transmission power at Monitor
P∗J The Optimum transmission power at Monitor
PcovertJ The transmission power at Monitor satisfying covert constraint
RM The achievable rate at Monitor
RB The achievable rate at Bob
X An indicator function to denote the event of successful eavesdropping at Monitor
δ A predetermined threshold for the covert transmission requirement
η The coefficient for the self-interference passive suppression
cases are discussed in Section V. Numerical results are analyzed in Section VI. Finally, we
conclude the paper in Section VII.
Notations- fυ (·) is the probability density function (PDF) of random variable (RV) υ; Fυ (·)
is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of RV υ; E(·) is the expected value of a RV;
Γ(µ, σ2) denotes the gamma PDF with shape µ and scale σ2; exp(σ2) denotes the exponential
PDF with mean σ2;Ei (·) denotes the exponential integral function. In addition, χ2 (ν) denotes
the central chi-square PDF with ν degrees of freedom; x ∼ CN (Λ,∆) denotes the circular
symmetric complex Gaussian random vector with mean vector Λ and covariance matrix ∆. In
addition, the symbol notations are given in Table 1.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a covert surveillance system as shown in Fig.1, where a legitimate monitor
(Monitor) aims to eavesdrop a suspicious communication link between the suspicious transmitter
(Alice) and suspicious receiver (Bob). It is assumed that Alice and Bob are each equipped
with a single antenna, while Monitor is equipped with two antennas and operates in a full-
duplex mode. Specifically, Monitor injects AN towards Bob and eavesdrops the signal from
Alice simultaneously. In addition, the suspicious receiver Bob not only receives the information
signal from Alice, but also detects the jamming signals from Monitor.
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Fig. 1. Covert surveillance system model
Assume that all channels are subject to quasi-static channel fading, and the channel coefficients
remain unchanged during each transmission block but vary independently for different fading
blocks. The CSIs (i.e., channel coefficients) of the Suspicious Link (Alice → Bob), Eavesdrop-
ping Link (Alice → Monitor), Jamming Link (Monitor → Bob) and Self-Interference Link are,
respectively, denoted as hA,B, hA,M , hM,B and hM,M , which are complex Gaussian RVs with
zero mean and variances σ2A,B/2, σ
2
A,M/2, σ
2
M,B/2, and σ
2
M,M/2, respectively. The transmission
power at Alice is Pa, which is fixed and publicly known by Bob and Monitor. The AN power
at Monitor is PJ satisfying 0 ≤ PJ ≤ PmaxJ and PmaxJ denotes the maximum allowed AN power
at Monitor. Then, when Alice transmits the messages, the received signals at Bob and Monitor
are given by
yB [i] =
√
PahA,BXa [i] +
√
PJhM,BJa [i] + nb [i] (1)
and
yM [i] =
√
PahA,MXa [i] +
√
PJ
√
ηhM,MJa[i] + nm [i] , (2)
where Xa is the transmitted signal from Alice satisfying E
[
Xa[i]
2] = 1; i = 1, 2, ..., n is the
index of each channel use and Ja is the AN from Monitor satisfying E
[
Ja[i]
2] = 1. As in [5], the
residual self-interference channel is modeled by
√
ηhM,M , where η (0 ≤ η ≤ 1) parameterizes
the effect of passive self-interference suppression. Finally, nb [i] is the additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) at Bob with variance σ2b , i.e., nb [i] ∼ CN (0, σ2b ); nm [i] is the AWGN at Monitor
with variance σ2m, i.e. nm [i] ∼ CN (0, σ2m).
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7A. Channel Knowledge
Since the channel estimation problem is generally not error-free, we assume that hA,B can be
separated into the known part ĥA,B and the uncertain part h˜A,B as in [29], and it is given by
hA,B = ĥA,B + h˜A,B, (3)
where ĥA,B and h˜A,B are independent complex Gaussian random variables with mean zero
and variances (1− ρa,b)σ2A,B and ρa,bσ2A,B, respectively. ρa,b ∈ [0, 1] denotes the correlation
coefficient between h˜A,B and hA,B. Namely, when ρa,b = 0, hA,B is perfectly known by Bob.
Usually, we assume that Bob can only know the statistical CSI of the Jamming Link hM,B,
and rely on the average measure of his performance to detect the AN from Monitor [29] [30].
Nevertheless, since Monitor injects AN, the instantaneous CSI of the jamming link can be
tracked by Bob [32]–[34]. Due to the imperfect channel estimation, we specifically investigate
the channel uncertainty of hM,B. In particular, hM,B at Bob can also be separated into the known
part ĥM,B and the uncertain part h˜M,B, and it is given by
hM,B = ĥM,B + h˜M,B, (4)
where ĥM,B and h˜M,B are independent complex Gaussian random variables with mean zero
and variances (1− ρm,b)σ2M,B and ρm,bσ2M,B, respectively. ρm,b ∈ [0, 1] denotes the correlation
coefficient between h˜M,B and hM,B.
B. Hypothesis Testing
In order to detect the AN from Monitor, Bob faces a binary hypothesis testing problem. We
consider two events: H0 and H1, where H0 denotes the null hypothesis when Monitor does not
transmit AN, and H1 denotes the alternative hypothesis when Monitor transmits AN to Bob. For
the two cases, the received signal at Bob is given by
yB [i] =
{ √
PahA,BXa [i] + nb [i] H0√
PahA,BXa [i] +
√
PJhM,BJa [i] + nb [i] H1.
(5)
By application of the Neyman-Pearson criterion [29], the decision rule for Bob is given by
T (n) =
1
n
∑n
i=1
|yB [i]|2
D0
≶
D1
Γ, (6)
where Γ is the detection threshold; D0 and D1 are the decisions in favor of H0 and H1,
respectively. In this paper, we consider an infinite number of channel uses i.e., n → ∞. Thus,
the average power received at Bob is given by
TB =
{
Pa|hA,B|2 + σ2b H0
Pa|hA,B|2 + PJ |hM,B|2 + σ2b H1,
(7)
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8Since
∣∣∣ĥA,B + h˜A,B∣∣∣2 can be approximated as ∣∣∣ĥA,B∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣h˜A,B∣∣∣2, and ∣∣∣ĥM,B + h˜M,B∣∣∣2 can be
approximated as
∣∣∣ĥM,B∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣h˜M,B∣∣∣2 [29], [31], (7) can be reformulated as
TB =
 Pa
∣∣∣hˆA,B∣∣∣2 + Pa∣∣∣h˜A,B∣∣∣2 + σ2b H0
Pa
∣∣∣hˆA,B∣∣∣2 + Pa∣∣∣h˜A,B∣∣∣2 + PJ ∣∣∣hˆM,B∣∣∣2 + PJ ∣∣∣h˜M,B∣∣∣2 + σ2b H1. (8)
In this paper, the false alarm probability and the missed detection probability are defined as
PFA
∆
= Pr (D1|H0) and PMD ∆= Pr (D0|H1). Since the false alarm and the missed detection
events are the two types of errors for Bob’s hypothesis test, under the assumption of equal
probability for H0 and H1, the performance of Bob’s hypothesis test is measured by
ξ = PFA + PMD, (9)
where ξ denotes the detection error probability (DEP). ξ = 0 means that Bob can detect AN
without error, and ξ = 1 means that Bob cannot detect AN from Monitor at all. From the
prosperity of Bob, it will determine the optimal detection threshold Γ∗ and obtain the minimum
DEP ξ∗ based on the estimated CSI of the Suspicious link and Jamming link, i.e., Pa
∣∣∣hˆA,B∣∣∣2
and PJ
∣∣∣hˆM,B∣∣∣2. From the perspective of Monitor, it will inject AN under the assumption that
Bob has the best AN detection performance, i.e. the worst case for Monitor is addressed.
III. INJECTING AN COVERTLY
When Bob detects the interference from Monitor, Alice will stop transmission. This will
degrade the surveillance performance. Hence, to improve the surveillance performance and
prevent AN from being detected, the monitor should inject AN covertly and control the AN
transmission power carefully. In this section, the worst case is considered where we assume that
Bob has the best detection ability. The optimal detection threshold Γ∗ and minimum DEP ξ∗ at
Bob are firstly derived under the channel uncertainties of hA,B and hM,B. Then, the maximum
permitted transmission AN power at the monitor is determined under the covert constraint. For
the optimal detection threshold Γ∗ and minimum DEP ξ∗ at Bob, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Γ∗ and ξ∗ are, respectively, given by
Γ∗ = X1 +X2 + k1 + σ2b (10)
and
ξ∗ = 1 + exp
(
− X2 + k1
ρa,bPaσ2A,B
)
−
ρa,bPaσ
2
A,B exp
(
− k1
ρa,bPaσ2A,B
)
− ρm,bPJσ2M,B exp
(
− k1
ρm,bPJσ2M,B
)
ρa,bPaσ2A,B − ρm,bPJσ2M,B , (11)
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9where X1 = Pa
∣∣∣hˆA,B∣∣∣2, X2 = PJ ∣∣∣hˆM,B∣∣∣2, and
k1 =
ρm,bρa,bPJPaσ
2
M,Bσ
2
A,B
ρm,bPJσ2M,B−ρa,bPaσ2A,B ln
(
1−
(
1− ρm,bPJσ2M,B
ρa,bPaσ2A,B
)
exp
(
− X2
ρa,bPaσ2A,B
))
.
Proof: According to (8), the average power received at Bob is
TB =
 X1 + Pa
∣∣∣h˜A,B∣∣∣2 + σ2b H0
X1 + Pa
∣∣∣h˜A,B∣∣∣2 +X2 + PJ ∣∣∣h˜M,B∣∣∣2 + σ2b H1, (12)
where X1 and X2 are perfectly known by Bob. As in [29], [30], the probabilities of false alarm
and missed detection are, respectively, given by
PFA = P
(
Pa
∣∣∣h˜A,B∣∣∣2 > Γ− σ2b −X1)
=
 1 Γ ≤ X1 + σ2bexp(− Γ−σ2b−X1
ρa,bPaσ2A,B
)
Γ > X1 + σ
2
b
(13)
and
PMD = P
(
Pa
∣∣∣h˜A,B∣∣∣2 + PJ ∣∣∣h˜M,B∣∣∣2 < Γ− σ2b −X1 −X2)
=

0 Γ ≤ X1 +X2 + σ2b
1−
ρa,bPaσ
2
A,B exp
(
−Γ−σ
2
b−X1−X2
ρa,bPaσ
2
A,B
)
−ρm,bPJσ2M,B exp
(
−Γ−σ
2
b−X1−X2
ρm,bPJσ
2
M,B
)
ρa,bPaσ
2
A,B−ρm,bPJσ2M,B
Γ > X1 +X2 + σ
2
b .
(14)
Since ξ = PFA + PMD, we can obtain the DEP as
ξ =

1 Γ < X1 + σ
2
b
PFA X1 + σ
2
b ≤ Γ < X1 +X2 + σ2b
PFA + PMD X1 +X2 + σ
2
b ≤ Γ.
(15)
Clearly, when X1 + σ2b ≤ Γ < X1 + X2 + σ2b , ξ decreases with Γ. On the other hand, we find
that ξ decreases with Γ when X1 + X2 + σ2b ≤ Γ < X1 + X2 + σ2b + k1, and ξ increases with
Γ when Γ > X1 + X2 + σ2b + k1. Hence, when Γ
∗ = X1 + X2 + σ2b + k1, ξ can achieve the
minimum value. The proof of this lemma is completed.
Since Monitor has no knowledge about X1 and X2, it has to rely on the average measure of
Bob’s detection performance to assess the possible covertness as in [29]. Note that the PDF of
X2 is given by
fX2 (x) =
1
(1− ρm,b)PJσ2M,B
exp
(
− x
(1− ρm,b)PJσ2M,B
)
. (16)
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Hence, the average minimum DEP ξ∗ is calculated as
ξ∗ =
∫ ∞
0
ξ∗fX2 (x)dx
= 1−
(
1− ρm,bPJσ
2
M,B
ρa,bPaσ2A,B
)− ρa,bPaσ2A,B
(1−ρm,b)PJσ2M,B ρa,bPaσ
2
A,B
(1− ρm,b)PJσ2M,B
×
∫ 1
ρm,bPJσ
2
M,B
ρa,bPaσ
2
A,B
x
(
1− ρm,bPJσ
2
M,B
ρa,bPaσ
2
A,B
)−1
(1− x)
ρa,bPaσ
2
A,B
(1−ρm,b)PJσ2M,B
−1
dx. (17)
ξ∗ decreases with P¯J which is proved in Appendix A. To provide more insight, Fig. 2 shows
ξ∗ for a given ρm,b versus the normalized power P¯J = PJ/σ2b . The exactness of (17) is verified
in Fig. 2. Furthermore, we get the relationship between ξ∗ and ρa,b, as well as with ρm,b in the
following remark.
Remark 1: ξ∗ increases with ρa,b. By contrast, ρm,b has a non-monotonic effect on ξ∗. This
indicates that the Suspicious Link channel uncertainty degrades Bob’s AN detection ability,
while the Jamming Link channel uncertainty can degrade or benefit Bob’s detection ability.
Specifically, when the jamming power is low, the jamming link uncertainty is beneficial to
the covert transmission. But when the jamming power is large, the jamming link uncertainty
is detrimental to the covert transmission because the optimal detection threshold is affected.
Moreover, the channel uncertainty can affect the AN power at Monitor by affecting Bob’s AN
detection ability, so as to affect the surveillance performance.
In practice, there are several factors affecting the uncertainty of the Suspicious link. For
example, high dynamic channel in time, frequency, and space domain, and receiver capability. It
is an effective way to improve the covert transmission performance by frequently changing the
electronic environment at Bob. As a result, Bob is difficult to get the perfect knowledge of the
Suspicious link. In addition, continuously changing the transmission power is also an attractive
method to increase the jamming link uncertainty.
In this paper, covert transmission is assumed ξ∗ ≥ 1 − δ, where δ denotes a predetermined
threshold for the covert transmission requirement. Note that when ξ∗ = 1−δ, we obtain P covertJ =(
ξ∗
)−1
(1− δ), where (ξ∗)−1 (1− δ) is the inverse function of ξ∗. If the AN power at Monitor is
higher than P covertJ , the covert constraint cannot be satisfied. Thus, to satisfy the covert constraint,
the allowable range of PJ is given by
0 ≤ PJ ≤ min
(
PmaxJ , P
covert
J
)
. (18)
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Fig. 2. The average minimum DEP ξ∗ against ρa,b for different ρm,b.
According to (18), the covert constraint is transformed to an AN transmission power constraint
at Monitor.
IV. SURVEILLANCE PERFORMANCE UNDER COVERT CONSTRAINT
When the AN power injected from Monitor is controlled to satisfy the covert constraint, Moni-
tor can overhear the suspicious link efficiently. There are several metrics for wireless surveillance
performance evaluation, such as the eavesdropping non-outage probability [4], [5], the average
monitor rate [8], [9], and the successful eavesdropping rate or the effective eavesdropping rate
[10], [11].
A. Eavesdropping Non-outage Probability
In this paper, for simplicity, we adopt the eavesdropping non-outage probability as a perfor-
mance metric, which is defined as E [X]. X is an indicator function to denote the event of
successful eavesdropping at Monitor as in [4], and it can be expressed as
X =
{
1 if RM ≥ RB
0 otherwise,
(19)
where X = 1 denotes eavesdropping non-outage event that Monitor can reliably decode the
information, and X = 0 denotes eavesdropping outage event that Monitor cannot perfectly
February 19, 2020 DRAFT
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decode the information. RB and RM are, respectively, denoted as the achievable rates at Bob
and Monitor, and they are given by
RB = log2
(
1 +
Pa|hA,B|2
PJ |hM,B|2 + σ2b
)
(20)
and
RM = log2
(
1 +
Pa|hA,M |2
ηPJ |hM,M |2 + σ2m
)
. (21)
To successfully eavesdrop the information of the Suspicious Link, Monitor should ensure that
its achievable data rate RM is greater than Bob’s rate RB. According to (19), E [X] can be
formulated as
E [X] = Prob
 Pa|hA,M |2
ηPJ |hM,M |2 + σ2m
≥
Pa
∣∣∣hˆA,B∣∣∣2
Pa
∣∣∣h˜A,B∣∣∣2 + PJ ∣∣∣h˜M,B + ĥM,B∣∣∣2 + σ2b

= Prob
(
Pa|hA,M |2
ηPJ |hM,M |2 + σ2m
≥ (1− ρa,b)Pa|hA,B|
2
ρa,bPa|hA,B|2 + PJ |hM,B|2 + σ2b
)
, (22)
From (22), it is obvious that different values of ρm,b have no direct effect on E [X]. In contrast,
E [X] increases with ρa,b.
B. Optimization Problem
Note that to maximize E [X], the AN transmitted from Monitor should not be detected at
Bob. Otherwise, Alice will stop transmission and Monitor can overhear nothing. To this end, the
objective for Monitor is to maximize the eavesdropping non-outage probability E [X] while AN
is injected covertly. Hence, the optimization problem can be formulated as
max
PJ
E [X] (23a)
s.t. 0 ≤ PJ ≤ PmaxJ , (23b)
ξ∗ ≥ 1− δ, (23c)
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where (23b) is the AN power constraint. Equation (23c) is the covert constraint. Note that the
objective function E [X] is not concave over the AN power PJ . Fortunately, according to [5,
Theorem 1], the optimal AN power P ∗J can be expressed as
P ∗J =

min (PmaxJ , P
covert
J ) if

∆1 > 0, ∆2 > 0 ,
∆2
∆1
≥ PmaxJ , andξ∗ ≥ 1− δ
∆1 = 0,∆2 > 0, ξ∗ ≥ 1− δ
∆2 ≥ 0, ξ∗ ≥ 1− δ
 ∆2 ≥ 0∆2 < 0, ∆2∆1 < PmaxJ , ∆3 ≥ ∆4
0 if

∆1 ≥ 0,∆2 ≤ 0
∆1 < 0,∆2 < 0
 ∆2∆1 ≥ PmaxJ∆2
∆1
< PmaxJ , ∆3 < ∆4
ξ∗ < 1− δ
min
(
∆2
∆1
, P covertJ
)
if∆1 > 0, ∆2 > 0,
∆2
∆1
< PmaxJ , ξ
∗ ≥ 1− δ,
(24)
where ∆1 = |hM,B|2 −
√
η|hM,M ||hˆA,B||hM,B|
|hA,M | , ∆2 =
|hˆA,B||hM,B|
√
η|hM,M ||hA,M |σ
2
m − Pa
∣∣∣h˜A,B∣∣∣2 − σ2b , ∆3 =
σ2m|hˆA,B|2|hM,B|2
Pa|h˜A,B|2+PJ |hM,B|2+σ2b , and ∆4 =
η|hM,M |2|hA,M |2(Pa|h˜A,B|2+σ2b)
ηPJ |hM,M |2+σ2m . From (24), we find that P
∗
J not
only depends on the relationship between the channel gains and noise powers but also on Alice’s
transmission power, which is different from the existing works [4]–[7]. This behavior is caused
by the channel uncertainty of the Suspicious link. In addition, even if AN introduces a higher
level of interference power at Bob than the self-interference power at Monitor, Monitor still needs
to consider the covert constraint rather than using full power to confuse Bob. As for the scenario
that Monitor can already overhear from the transmitter successfully without AN or when the
self-interference is severe, no AN is required and P ∗J = 0. After we determine the optimal AN
power, the following lemma determines the exact eavesdropping non-outage probability E [X].
Lemma 2: E [X] can be calculated as (56).
Proof: See Appendix C. Lemma 2 presents a closed-form expression for the eavesdropping
non-outage probability. To provide more insight, Fig. 3 shows the eavesdropping non-outage
probability versus PJ without covert constraint. In addition, the exactness of (56) is verified in
Fig. 3. We can see that the relationship between PJ and eavesdropping non-outage probability
is not monotonous, even if there is no covert constraint. This is due to self-interference effect.
Although it is challenging to obtain the exact expression for the optimal AN power and get the
maximum eavesdropping non-outage probability under covert constraint, a simple search method
can be sufficient to solve the optimization problem (23a). According to (18), the allowable range
of PJ is ensured, thus the maximum E [X] can be obtained by Algorithm 1. In this algorithm,
∆PJ denotes the incremental step for PJ , and it can be determined by the required E [X]
accuracy.
February 19, 2020 DRAFT
14
0 5 10 15 20
P
J
 (dB)
0.86
0.88
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
E
av
es
d
ro
p
p
in
g
 N
o
n
-o
u
ta
g
e 
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
Simulation
Exact
2
M,B
=15dB, 5dB,0dB
Fig. 3. Eavesdropping Non-outage Probability E [X] against the AN power PJ without covert constraint.
Algorithm 1 E [X] maximization in different scenarios
1: Initialization: δ and P ∗J
2: According to Lemma 1, the average minimum DEP can be obtained.
3: if (23c) is satisfied, (18) can be obtained.
else E [X] = 0, break;
4: Then, set i = 0, PJ = 0, P ∗J = 0 and j = 0.
5: Repeat:
a) i = i+ 1, PJ = PJ + ∆PJ
b) substitute PJ into (56), we can obtain E [X].
c)if E [X] ≥ j. Then j=E [X] and P ∗J = PJ
6: Until PJ cannot satisfy (18). The optimal AN power is P ∗J , and the maximum eavesdropping
non-outage probability is j.
V. SPECIAL CASES
The covert surveillance model proposed in Section III can be useful for the general channel
uncertainty cases, where we assume 0 < ρm,b < 1 and 0 < ρa,b < 1. In the following, we discuss
the covert surveillance performance under several special cases.
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A. Special Case 1: ρa,b = 0, 0 ≤ ρm,b ≤ 1
For this special case, Bob has perfect knowledge of the instantaneous hA,B, and the average
power received at Bob is
TB =
 Pa|hA,B|
2 + σ2b H0
Pa|hA,B|2 +X2 + PJ
∣∣∣h˜M,B∣∣∣2 + σ2b H1, (25)
where the average received power of H0 is perfectly known by Bob. Since all channels are
subject to quasi-static channel fading, the average power received at Bob of H1 is higher than
that of H0 when Monitor injects the AN. If Bob already knows the average received power of
H0, he can determine the detection threshold as Γ∗ = Pa|hA,B|2 + σ2b . Once Monitor injects the
AN, it will be detected by Bob. Hence, it is better for Monitor to remain silent and P ∗J = 0.
Following that, (22) can be rewritten as
E [X] = Prob
(
|hA,M |2
σ2m
≥ |hA,B|
2
σ2b
)
=
σ2A,Mσ
2
b
σ2A,Mσ2b + σ2A,Bσ2m
. (26)
B. Special Case 2: ρa,b 6= 0, ρm,b = 0
For this case, Bob has perfect knowledge of the Jamming Link and imperfect knowledge of the
Suspicious Link. Bob’s optimal detection threshold Γ∗ and minimum DEP ξ∗ are, respectively,
given by the following lemma.
Lemma 4: For special case 2, Γ∗ and ξ∗ at Bob are given by
Γ∗ = X1 + PJ |hM,B|2 + σ2b (27)
and
ξ∗ = exp
(
− PJ |hM,B|
2
ρa,bPaσ2A,B
)
. (28)
Proof: According to (8), the average power received at Bob is
TB =
 X1 + Pa
∣∣∣h˜A,B∣∣∣2 + σ2b H0
X1 + Pa
∣∣∣h˜A,B∣∣∣2 + PJ |hM,B|2 + σ2b H1, (29)
where X1 and PJ |hM,B|2 are perfectly known by Bob. Thus, the probabilities of false alarm and
missed detection are, respectively, given by
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PFA = P
(
Pa
∣∣∣h˜A,B∣∣∣2 > Γ− σ2b −X1)
=
 1 Γ ≤ X1 + σ2bexp(− Γ−σ2b−X1
ρa,bPaσ
2
A,B
)
Γ > X1 + σ
2
b
(30)
and
PMD = P
(
Pa
∣∣∣h˜A,B∣∣∣2 < Γ− σ2b −X1 − PJ |hM,B|2)
=

0 Γ ≤ X1 + PJ |hM,B|2 + σ2b
1− exp
(
−Γ−σ
2
b−X1−PJ |hM,B|2
ρa,bPaσ
2
A,B
)
Γ > X1 + PJ |hM,B|2 + σ2b .
(31)
Since ξ = PFA + PMD, we can get the corresponding DEP as follows
ξ =

1 Γ < σ2b +X1
PFA σ
2
b +X1 ≤ Γ < σ2b +X1 + PJ |hM,B|2
PFA + PMD σ
2
b +X1 + PJ |hM,B|2 ≤ Γ.
(32)
Clearly, when X1+σ2b ≤ Γ < X1+PJ |hM,B|2+σ2b , ξ decreases with Γ. When X1+PJ |hM,B|2+
σ2b ≤ Γ, ξ increases with Γ. Hence, Γ∗ = X1 + PJ |hM,B|2 + σ2b , and ξ∗ = exp
(
− PJ |hM,B|
2
ρa,bPaσ2A,B
)
.
The proof of this lemma is completed.
Then, the average minimum DEP can be calculated as
ξ∗ =
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
− PJ |hM,B|
2
ρa,bPaσ2A,B
)
× f
PJ |hM,B|2 (x)dx
=
ρa,bPaσ
2
A,B
ρa,bPaσ2A,B + PJσ2M,B
, (33)
where f
PJ |hM,B|2 (x) =
1
PJσ
2
M,B
exp
(
− x
PJσ
2
M,B
)
is the PDF of PJ |hM,B|2.
Remark 2: When compared to special case 1, Bob’s imperfect knowledge of hA,B is more
crucial to covert surveillance. Once Bob has perfect knowledge of hA,B, Monitor cannot inject
AN power at all. However, when Bob has perfect knowledge of hM,B, Monitor still can inject
AN to assist eavesdropping under the covert constraint.
C. Special Case 3: ρa,b = 1, 0 ≤ ρm,b ≤ 1
According to Remark 1, Bob’s AN detection ability degrades with ρa,b, and has non-monotonic
relationship with ρm,b. Hence, the most desirable case for Monitor (i.e, ξ∗ is maximized.) is
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ρa,b = 1. In this case, Bob’s optimal detection threshold Γ∗ and minimum DEP ξ∗ under this
special case are, respectively, given by the following lemma.
Lemma 3: For special case 3, Γ∗ and ξ∗ at Bob are, respectively, given by
Γ∗ = X2 + σ2b + k2 (34)
and
ξ∗ = 1 + exp
(
−X2 + k2
Paσ2A,B
)
−
Paσ
2
A,B exp
(
− k2
Paσ2A,B
)
− ρm,bPJσ2M,B exp
(
− k2
ρm,bPJσ
2
M,B
)
Paσ2A,B − ρm,bPJσ2M,B
, (35)
where k2 =
ρm,bPJσ
2
M,BPaσ
2
A,B
ρm,bPJσ
2
M,B−Paσ2A,B
ln
(
1−
(
1− ρm,bPJσ
2
M,B
Paσ2A,B
)
exp
(
− X2
Paσ2A,B
))
.
Proof: According to (8), the average power received at Bob is
TB =
 Pa|hA,B|
2 + σ2b H0
Pa|hA,B|2 +X2 + PJ
∣∣∣h˜M,B∣∣∣2 + σ2b H1, (36)
where X2 is perfectly known by Bob. Thus, the probabilities of false alarm and missed detection
are, respectively, given by
PFA = P
(
Pa|hA,B|2 > Γ− σ2b
)
=
 1 Γ ≤ σ2bexp(− Γ−σ2b
Paσ2A,B
)
Γ > σ2b
(37)
and
PMD = P
(
Pa|hA,B|2 + PJ
∣∣∣h˜M,B∣∣∣2 < Γ− σ2b −X2)
=

0 Γ ≤ X2 + σ2b
1−
Paσ2A,B exp
(
−Γ−σ
2
b−X2
Paσ
2
A,B
)
−ρm,bPJσ2M,B exp
(
− Γ−σ
2
b−X2
ρm,bPJσ
2
M,B
)
Paσ2A,B−ρm,bPJσ2M,B
Γ > X2 + σ
2
b .
(38)
Since ξ = PFA + PMD, we can get the corresponding DEP as
ξ =

1 Γ < σ2b
PFA σ
2
b ≤ Γ < X2 + σ2b
PFA + PMD X2 + σ
2
b ≤ Γ.
(39)
It is obvious that ξ decreases with Γ when σ2b ≤ Γ < X2 + σ2b . Similar to Lemma 1, we can
prove that ξ decreases with Γ when X2 + σ2b ≤ Γ < X2 + k2 + σ2b , and ξ increases with Γ
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when Γ > X2 + k2 + σ2b . Hence, when Γ
∗ = X2 + k2 + σ2b , ξ can achieve the minimum value,
respectively. Thus, the average minimum DEP ξ∗ can be calculated as
ξ∗ =
∫ ∞
0
ξ∗fX2 (x)dx
= 1−
(
1− ρm,bPJσ
2
M,B
Paσ2A,B
)− Paσ2A,B
(1−ρm,b)PJσ2M,B Paσ
2
A,B
(1− ρm,b)PJσ2M,B
×
∫ 1
ρm,bPJσ
2
M,B
Paσ
2
A,B
x
(
1− ρm,bPJσ
2
M,B
Paσ
2
A,B
)−1
(1− x)
Paσ
2
A,B
(1−ρm,b)PJσ2M,B
−1
dx, (40)
the exactness of (40) is verified in Fig. 4. Similar to Appendix B, we can verify that ρm,b has a
non-monotonic effect on ξ∗ in this case. Hence, the most desirable case is ρa,b = 1 and ρm,b = 1
or ρa,b = 1 and ρm,b = 0.
In particular, when ρm,b = 1, Γ∗ and ξ∗ at Bob are, respectively, given by
Γ∗ = k3 + σ2b (41)
and
ξ∗ = exp
(
− k3
Paσ2A,B
)
+ 1− 1
Paσ2A,B − PJσ2M,B
(
Paσ
2
A,B exp
(
− k3
Paσ2A,B
)
− PJσ2M,B exp
(
− k3
PJσ2M,B
))
, (42)
where k3 =
PJσ
2
M,BPaσ
2
A,B
PJσ
2
M,B−Paσ2A,B
ln
PJσ
2
M,B
Paσ2A,B
. Also, when ρm,b = 0, Γ∗ and ξ∗ at Bob are, respectively,
given by
Γ∗ = PJ |hM,B|2 + σ2b (43)
and
ξ∗ =
1
1 +
PJσ
2
M,B
Paσ2A,B
. (44)
Note that we investigate special case 3 depending on ρa,b = 1 and the different values of ρm,b.
To provide more insight, Fig. 4 shows ξ∗ at a given ρm,b versus the variable ρa,b (in the range
between 0 and 1). It is observed that ξ∗ increases as a function of ρa,b. Note that ξ∗ = 0 when
ρa,b = 0, which is verified in special case 1.
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Fig. 4. The average minimum DEP ξ∗ against ρa,b with different values of ρm,b.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical results for covert surveillance performance are presented under
channel uncertainties for both the Suspicious link and the Jamming link. Assume the noise
variance at Bob σ2b = 1 and the noise variance at Monitor σ
2
m = 1. The self-interference
coefficient is η = 0.5. The transmission power Pa, PJ and PmaxJ are, respectively, normalized by
the noise variance, denoted as P¯a, P¯J and P¯maxJ in the following simulation, i.e., P¯a = Pa/σ
2
b ,
P¯J = PJ/σ
2
b , and P¯
max
J = P
max
J /σ
2
b . In addition, the channel qualities of Alice → Bob, Alice
→ Monitor, Monitor → Bob, and Monitor → Monitor are normalized as γ¯A,B = σ2A,B/σ2b ,
γ¯A,M = σ
2
A,M/σ
2
m, γ¯M,B = σ
2
M,B/σ
2
b , and γ¯M,M = σ
2
M,M/σ
2
m, respectively. Unless otherwise
specified, P¯a = 25dB, and P¯maxJ = 25dB.
For comparison, the performance of the two benchmark schemes proposed in [4] are also
investigated as follows: 1) Passive eavesdropping, i.e., P ∗J = 0. 2) Proactive eavesdropping with
constant AN power, i.e., P ∗J = P
max
J . However, due to the covert constraint, Monitor can not
inject AN with full power PmaxJ . Therefore, we improve the second scheme into a proactive
eavesdropping with constant covert AN power scheme i.e., P ∗J = min (P
max
J , P
covert
J ).
Figure 5 presents the average minimum DEP ξ∗ versus ρa,b and ρm,b for different PJ . It can be
seen from Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b) that increasing ρa,b leads to the degradation of Bob’s detection
performance. In contrast, ρm,b causes non-monotonic influence on ξ∗ just as shown in Fig. 5(b),
which is consistent with Remark 1. Specifically, when ρa,b = 0 and ρm,b 6= 0, we obtain ξ∗ = 0.
However, when ρm,b = 0 and ρa,b 6= 0, we obtain ξ∗ 6= 0. This means that Bob’s imperfect
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(a) P¯J = 10dB (b) P¯J = 25dB
Fig. 5. The average minimum DEP ξ∗ against ρm,b. γ¯A,B = 1 and γ¯A,M = 1.
knowledge of hA,B is crucial to covert surveillance. If Bob has perfect knowledge of hA,B,
Monitor cannot inject AN power at all. Nevertheless, when Bob has perfect knowledge of hM,B,
Monitor still can inject AN power with a non-unity probability of being detected by Bob. Note
that the value of ξ∗ is maximized when ρa,b = 1, which can be regarded as an upper-bound for
Monitor’s covert AN transmission, as given in special case 3.
Figure 6 shows eavesdropping non-outage probability E [X] versus γ¯M,M . It is clear that γ¯M,M
has no impact on E [X] of the passive eavesdropping scheme where PJ = 0. In contrast, for
the constant covert AN power scheme under the covert constraint, E [X] decreases with γ¯M,M
due to the severe self-interference at Monitor. Specifically, when γ¯M,M < −7dB, the AN power
introduces a higher level of interference power at Bob than the self-interference power at Monitor.
Hence, it is better to inject AN towards Bob with P ∗J = min (P
max
J , P
covert
J ). Thus, the curves of
optimal AN power scheme coincide with the curves of constant covert AN power scheme. When
−7dB < γ¯M,M < 2dB, the optimal AN power P ∗J lies in the range (0,min (PmaxJ , P covertJ )).
It is observed that the optimal AN power scheme achieves higher eavesdropping performance,
compared to the two benchmark schemes. When γ¯M,M > 2dB, due to the severe self-interference,
Monitor keeps silent and P ∗J = 0. Then, the curve of optimal AN power scheme coincides with
the curve of passive eavesdropping scheme. As expected, the proposed scheme substantially
outperforms the two benchmark schemes regardless of γ¯M,M . Moreover, it is better for Monitor
to remain silent when self-interference becomes severe. Hence, we find that ρm,b has no effect on
E [X] when γ¯M,M > 2dB. We conclude that increasing the channel uncertainty of the Jamming
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Fig. 6. Eavesdropping Non-outage Probability E [X] against γ¯M,M . ρa,b = 0.5, ρm,b = 0.5, η = 0.1, δ = 0.5, γ¯A,B = 5dB,
γ¯M,B = 10dB, γ¯A,M = −10dB, σ2b = 1, and σ2m = 1.
Link is an effective means to enhance covert surveillance performance only when the self-
interference at Monitor is small.
E [X] for different γ¯M,B is illustrated in Fig. 7. Different from γ¯M,M in Fig. 6, γ¯M,B not
only directly affects E [X] according to (22), but also indirectly affects E [X] according to the
covert constraint (17). When γ¯M,B < −2dB, the curves of constant covert AN power scheme
converge together for different values of δ since Monitor can inject AN with maximum power
when γ¯M,B is small. However, due to the fact that AN power introduces higher self-interference
at Monitor, Monitor should keep silent and P ∗J = 0. In this case, the curves of optimal AN power
scheme coincide with the curves of the passive eavesdropping scheme. When γ¯M,B = −2dB,
the curves of constant AN power scheme begin to separate, since the covert constraint δ = 0.1
is stricter than δ = 0.5. Moreover, when γ¯M,B < 7dB, E [X] of the optimal AN power scheme
has same value for different δ. However, as γ¯M,B continues to increase, the value of E [X] with
δ = 0.5 is larger than that with δ = 0.1. This observation demonstrates that a loose covert
constraint can achieve higher eavesdropping performance only when the AN power at Bob is
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Fig. 7. Eavesdropping Non-outage Probability E [X] against γ¯M,B . ρa,b = 0.5, ρm,b = 0.5, η = 0.1, γ¯A,B = 10dB,
γ¯M,M = −10dB, γ¯A,M = −10dB, σ2b = 1, and σ2m = 1.
larger than the self-interference power at Monitor. In other words, once the self-interference
becomes severe, Monitor should remain silent. Thus, the covert constraint has no effect on the
surveillance performance.
Figure 8 investigates the eavesdropping non-outage probability E [X] versus ρa,b. It is clear that
the curve of optimal AN power scheme coincides with the curve of constant covert AN power
scheme when γ¯M,M = −5dB in Fig. 8(a). This figure demonstrates that when the AN introduces
a higher level of interference power at Bob than the self-interference power at Monitor, it is
better to use full AN power. However, when γ¯M,M = −2dB in Fig. 8(b), the self-interference
becomes severe. Therefore, it is better for Monitor to remain silent, and the curve of optimal AN
power scheme coincides with the curve of passive eavesdropping scheme. In Fig. 8(b), we find
that the curve of optimal AN power scheme firstly coincides with the curve of constant covert
AN power scheme, and then coincides with the curve of passive eavesdropping scheme as ρa,b is
increased, because ρa,b affects the relationship between E [X] and PJ as shown in (24). When the
value of ρa,b is small, E [X] increases with PJ . Hence, the constant covert AN power scheme can
achieve better performance than the passive eavesdropping scheme. Nevertheless, when the value
February 19, 2020 DRAFT
23
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
a,b
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
E
av
es
d
ro
p
in
g
 N
o
n
-o
u
ta
g
e 
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
Passive eavesdropping scheme
Constant covert AN power scheme
Optimal AN power scheme
(a) γ¯M,M = −5dB
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
a,b
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
E
av
es
d
ro
p
in
g
 N
o
n
-o
u
ta
g
e 
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
Passive eavesdropping scheme
Constant covert AN power scheme
Optimal AN power scheme
(b) γ¯M,M = −2dB
Fig. 8. Eavesdropping Non-outage Probability E [X] against ρa,b. ρa,b = 0.5, ρm,b = 0.5, η = 0.1, δ = 0.5, γ¯A,B = −5dB,
γ¯M,B = 1, γ¯A,M = −10dB, σ2b = 1, and σ2m = 1.
of ρa,b is large, E [X] decreases with PJ and the passive eavesdropping scheme outperforms the
constant covert AN power scheme. In both Fig. 8(a) and Fig. 8(b), the proposed optimal AN
power scheme achieves the best performance in terms of eavesdropping non-outage probability.
Moreover, we see that E [X] increases with ρa,b. It indicates that the channel uncertainty of
the Suspicious link is an effective way to achieve a better eavesdropping performance. However,
channel uncertainty of the Jamming link only has effect on eavesdropping performance when the
self-interference at Monitor is small just as shown in Fig. 6. Hence, we conclude that Suspicious
Link uncertainty is crucial to improve the surveillance performance.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the performance of wireless surveillance systems under a covert
constraint. Considering the channel uncertainties of both the Suspicious Link and Jamming Link,
closed-form expressions for the optimal AN detection threshold and the average minimum DEP
are derived. Numerical results show that the channel uncertainty can effectively improve covert
surveillance performance. Specifically, Suspicious Link channel uncertainty has greater influence
than Jamming link channel uncertainty on surveillance performance. Once the suspicious user has
perfect channel knowledge of the Suspicious Link, injecting AN by the legitimate Monitor does
not assist the eavesdropping at all. However, even if the suspicious user has perfect knowledge
of the Jamming Link, the legitimate Monitor can still inject AN under the covert constraint. In
addition, Suspicious Link channel uncertainty can always affect covert surveillance performance.
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In contrast, Jamming Link channel uncertainty can affect the covert surveillance performance
only when the interference caused by AN at Bob is greater than the self-interference at the
full-duplex Monitor.
We hope that this paper can provide a new paradigm for designing legitimate surveillance
schemes when the suspicious users are intelligent and capable of detecting the AN from Monitor.
APPENDIX A
We can rewrite (17) as
ξ∗ =
∫ ∞
0

1 + exp
(
−PJ(1−ρm,b)x+k1
ρa,bPaσ
2
A,B
)
−
ρa,bPaσ
2
A,B exp
(
− k1
ρa,bPaσ
2
A,B
)
−ρm,bPJσ2M,B exp
(
− k1
ρm,bPJσ
2
M,B
)
ρa,bPaσ
2
A,B−ρm,bPJσ2M,B
× ϕ (x)dx, (45)
where ϕ (x) = 1
σ2M,B
exp
(
− 1
σ2M,B
x
)
.
Then, since PJ has no effect on ϕ (x), the derivative dξ
∗
dPJ
can be written as
dξ∗
dPJ
=
d
∫∞
0
ξ∗ × ϕ (x) dx
dPJ
=
∫ ∞
0
dξ∗
dPJ
× ϕ (x)dx. (46)
It is evident that the monotonic relationship between ξ∗ and PJ depends on dξ
∗
dPJ
. First, we
introduce auxiliary variables θ = exp
(
−PJ(1−ρm,b)
ρa,bPaσ
2
A,B
x
)
, and β = −
(
1− ρm,bPJσ
2
M,B
ρa,bPaσ
2
A,B
)
θ + 1.
Following that, dξ
∗
dPJ
is given by
dξ∗
dPJ
= exp
(
− k1
ρa,bPaσ2A,B
)−( ρa,bPaσ2A,B
ρm,bPJσ2M,B
− 1
)−2
ρa,bPaσ
2
A,B
PJρm,bPJσ2M,B
(β ln β + 1− β) + dθ
dPJ
 .
(47)
It is evident that dθ
dPJ
< 0 and β ln β + 1− β ≥ 0. Thus, dξ∗
dPJ
< 0. The proof is completed.
APPENDIX B
A. The monotonicity of ξ∗ with ρa,b
Since ρa,b has no effect on ϕ (x), the derivative dξ
∗
dρa,b
can be written as
dξ∗
dρa,b
=
d
∫∞
0
ξ∗ × ϕ (x) dx
dρa,b
=
∫ ∞
0
dξ∗
dρa,b
× ϕ (x)dx. (48)
By following similar procedures as in Appendix A, ∂ξ
∗
∂λ1
is given by
dξ∗
dρa,b
=
1
ρa,b
exp
(
− k1
ρa,bPaσ2A,B
)(ρm,bPJσ2M,B
ρa,bPaσ2A,B
− 1
)−2
ρm,bPJσ
2
M,B
ρa,bPaσ2A,B
(β ln β + 1− β)− θ ln θ
 .
(49)
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It is obvious that 0 < θ < 1, thus θ ln θ < 0, and β ln β + 1− β ≥ 0. Hence, we have
dξ∗
dρa,b
> 0. The proof is completed.
B. The monotonicity of ξ∗ with ρm,b
Since ρm,b has no effect on ϕ (x), the derivative dξ
∗
dρm,b
can be written as
dξ∗
dρm,b
=
d
∫∞
0
ξ∗ × ϕ (x) dx
dρm,b
=
∫ ∞
0
dξ∗
dρm,b
× ϕ (x)dx. (50)
Then, dξ
∗
dρm,b
is given by
dξ∗
dρm,b
= exp
(
− k1
ρa,bPaσ2A,B
)−( ρa,bPaσ2A,B
ρm,bPJσ2M,B
− 1
)−2
ρa,bPaσ
2
A,B
ρm,bρm,bPJσ2M,B
(β ln β + 1− β) + dθ
dρm,b
 .
(51)
It is evident that dθ
dρm,b
> 0 and β ln β + 1− β ≥ 0. Thus, there exists a value of ρm,b that can
achieve dξ
∗
dρm,b
> 0, and ξ∗ increases with ρm,b. Also. there exists a value of ρm,b such that ξ∗
decreases with ρm,b. Hence, ρm,b causes non-monotonic influence on ξ∗. The proof is completed.
APPENDIX C
According to (22), E [X] can be derived as
E [X] = Prob
 Pa|hA,M |2
ηPJ |hM,M |2 + σ2m
≥
Pa
∣∣∣hˆA,B∣∣∣2
Pa
∣∣∣h˜A,B∣∣∣2 + PJ |hM,B|2 + σ2b
 . (52)
Let γM =
Pa|hA,M |2
ηPJ |hM,M |2+σ2m , and the CDF and PDF of γM are, respectively, given by
FγM (z) =
∫ ∞
0
1
PJσ2M,M
exp
(
− x
PJσ2M,M
)
dx
∫ z(ηx+σ2m)
0
1
Paσ2A,M
exp
(
− y
Paσ2A,M
)
dy
= 1− 1
PJσ2M,M
1(
1
PJσ
2
M,M
+ zη
Paσ2A,M
) exp(− zσ2m
Paσ2A,M
)
(53)
and
fγM (z) =
1
PJσ2M,M
1
Paσ2A,M
exp
(
− zσ
2
m
Paσ2A,M
)(
1
PJσ2M,M
+
zη
Paσ2A,M
)−1
×
η( 1
PJσ2M,M
+
zη
Paσ2A,M
)−1
+ σ2m
 . (54)
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Similarly, let γB =
Pa|hˆA,B|2
Pa|h˜A,B|2+PJ |hM,B|2+σ2b , and the CDF of γB is given by
FγB (z) = 1−
(
1
ρa,bPaσ
2
A,B
+ z
(1−ρa,b)Paσ2A,B
)−1
−
(
1
PJσ
2
M,B
+ z
(1−ρa,b)Paσ2A,B
)−1
ρa,bPaσ2A,B − PJσ2M,B
× exp
(
− zσ
2
b
(1− ρa,b)Paσ2A,B
)
. (55)
By invoking [35, eq. (3.352.4)] and [35, eq. (3.353.3)], E [X] can be calculated as
E [X] = Prob (γM ≥ γB) =
∫ ∞
0
FγB (x) fγM (x)dx
= 1− 1
PJσ2M,MPaσ
2
A,M
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−
(
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2
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)−1
−
(
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2
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ηPJσ2M,M
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2
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)−1
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2
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− 1
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2
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)−1
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(
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2
b
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)
+
1(
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2
M,M
ρabPaσ2A,B
)−1
×
( 1
ηPJσ2M,M
− 1− ρa,b
ρa,bPaσ2A,M
)−1
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, (56)
where L (x) = exp (x)Ei (−x).
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